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he total volume of nonfinancial commercial paper outstanding
peaked in the fall of 2000 and has declined rapidly ever since.
By September 2002, the market had shrunk more than 50
percent. Relative to historical patterns, both the magnitude and the
timing of the decline are unusual. The decline is the largest on record,
and the market started to shrink before the recent recession began. In
the past, the volume of commercial paper outstanding tended to
increase during the early stages of recessions.
Commercial paper is an important source of external funding for
corporate borrowers and has become increasingly popular over the years.
In 1966, the volume of nonfinancial commercial paper outstanding was
typically less than 0.5 percent of bank loans to commercial and indus-
trial borrowers. Since then, growth in the commercial paper market has
averaged more than 20 percent per year, compared to an average rate of
only 7 percent for bank commercial and industrial loans. And despite
the recent dramatic decline, the volume of commercial paper outstand-
ing in September 2002 was still about one-sixth of bank commercial
and industrial loans. 
Pu Shen is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Jonathan
Corning, a research associate at the bank, helped prepare the article. This article is on
the bank’s website at www.kc.frb.org.
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This article investigates the factors contributing to the dramatic
decline in the commercial paper market and assesses whether the recent
shrinkage is likely to continue. The article begins by documenting the
recent sharp decline in the volume of nonfinancial commercial paper
outstanding and contrasts this development with historical experience.
The second section considers the factors that may have reduced the
supply of credit in the commercial paper market, and the third section
discusses the factors that may have reduced the demand. The article
concludes that declines in both supply and demand have contributed to
the shrinkage of the market. Looking forward, although the demand
factors are waning, the supply factors are likely to persist in the near
term and keep the commercial paper market under pressure. 
I. THE SHRINKING COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET
Nonfinancial commercial paper is short-term unsecured debt issued
by nonfinancial corporations, typically large industrial or service firms
and utility companies. Financial commercial paper, in contrast, is issued
by financial companies, such as banks. This article focuses on nonfinan-
cial commercial paper. For simplicity, nonfinancial commercial paper is
referred to only as “commercial paper,” and the commercial paper
market is referred to as “the market.” Appendix 1 provides an overview
of the commercial paper market.
Commercial paper represents an important source of short-term
funding for firms with very high credit ratings because it is one of the
cheapest sources of external funding available. For example, the interest
rate paid on 30-day commercial paper is usually comparable to the
federal funds rate. The market, however, has shrunk considerably in the
past two years. At its peak in November 2000, the total volume of
commercial paper outstanding was about $351 billion. By September
2002, the volume outstanding had dropped more than 50 percent, to
about $159 billion, its lowest level in almost eight years (Chart 1).1This
unusual decline is the largest on record. In the previous five episodes of
recession-related market shrinkage, the largest reduction in volume out-
standing was about 27 percent.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 57
This dramatic decline reversed a period of rapid growth in the
issuance of nonfinancial commercial paper. After a few years of hesitant
growth coming out of the recession of 1990, the commercial paper
market grew robustly in the late 1990s. For the four years before its
peak in 2000, the volume of commercial paper outstanding grew an
average of about 18 percent per year, compared to an average yearly
decline of roughly 35 percent over the last 22 months. 
In  addition to declining so rapidly, the timing of the current
market’s decline has also been unusual. Historically, commercial paper
borrowing has usually expanded in the early stages of a recession and
only started to decline when the economy was well-into recession. Chart
2 plots the volume of commercial paper outstanding around recessions,
from six months before to 18 months after the start of each recession.
The volume outstanding in the first month of each recession is normal-
ized to 1 so that the changes during different recessions can be
compared. The dashed line shows the average volume of commercial
Chart 1
VOLUME OF NONFINANCIAL COMMERCIAL PAPER
OUTSTANDING
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessionary periods as defined by the NBER Business Cycle Dating
Committee. For the most recent recession, only the start date is indicated.
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paper outstanding across the four recessions that occurred from 1969 to
1981. The grey line is the volume of commercial paper around the 1990
recession. The solid black line is the volume for the recent recession. 
The current shrinkage differs dramatically from historical patterns.
For each of the pre-1990 recessions, the commercial paper market grew
substantially in the early stages of the recession and typically started to
shrink about 12 months into the recession. During the 1990 recession,
the pattern was similar, but the magnitudes of both the early growth
and later decline were smaller. The market continued to grow after the
recession started, just as in the past, but the growth was relatively weak
and short-lived. In sharp contrast, the rapid shrinkage in the current
market started four months before the onset of the recent recession.
What caused the market to shrink so rapidly and so early? The
factors that may have contributed to the recent shrinkage can be sepa-
rated into two groups: those affecting the supply of credit in the
commercial paper market and those affecting the demand for credit in
Chart 2
NORMALIZED COMMERCIAL PAPER VOLUME
AROUND THE START OF RECESSIONS
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the market. The next section focuses on the factors that may have
reduced the supply. The following section focuses on factors that may
have reduced the demand.
II. FACTORS REDUCING THE SUPPLY OF CREDIT 
Generally, the supply of funding for commercial paper depends on
investors’ willingness to participate in the market. This willingness can
be lessened by two factors. One is the actual or perceived deterioration
of the creditworthiness of borrowers who were previously considered to
be of the highest quality. This factor usually causes a reduction in credit
supply only in the commercial paper market. The other factor is a
general reduction in investors’ tolerance for risk. This factor works uni-
versally in all credit markets: A general reduction in investors’ tolerance
for risk means that for any given yield and credit quality, investors are
willing to supply fewer funds, thus reducing the supply of credit. Both
factors contributed to the recent shrinkage of the market.
Widespread declines in credit quality
In the past two years, the economy has witnessed unusually wide-
spread deterioration in the credit quality of many traditionally
high-quality firms. The result has been a reduced supply of credit in
the commercial paper market due to a unique feature of the market: It
usually accepts only very high-quality commercial paper that bears vir-
tually no risk of default.2 Most companies enter the commercial paper
market with a top-tier rating. If a company is downgraded from the
top tier, the amount of commercial paper it has outstanding typically
declines. Often the company eventually exits the market altogether.3
(Appendix 2 provides more details about this feature of the commer-
cial paper market and the “orderly exit” mechanism that comes into
play when a company’s actual or perceived creditworthiness declines.)
With fewer companies issuing commercial paper, many investors
simply substitute other safe short-term assets, such as Treasury bills,
into their portfolios. As a result, the aggregate supply of credit to the
market declines.460 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The collapse of the telecommunications industry. An industrywide
credit deterioration in the telecommunications industry has left most of
the telecom firms unable to borrow in the commercial paper market.
Trouble within the telecommunications industry started well before the
recent recession and has continued for more than two years. The speed
of the credit deterioration in many telecom firms has been unusually
rapid. As many telecom firms were heavy users of commercial paper
before their recent credit deterioration, the industry’s collapse may have
contributed both to the unusual timing and to the magnitude of the
current decline in commercial paper. 
Lucent Technologies was one of the first large telecom companies to
see its commercial paper downgraded from top-tier quality. After it was
downgraded in October 2000, Lucent found itself unable to roll over
the maturing commercial paper and had to rely on alternative financing
methods, such as bank loans and longer term corporate bonds. Since
Lucent’s downgrade, many telecom companies have been forced to find
alternatives to commercial paper to finance their operations. AT&T,
British Telecom, Corning, Motorola, and Nortel Networks are a few
examples of telecom firms that used to enjoy the top-tier commercial
paper rating but were downgraded, many repeatedly, in 2001.5
Unusually widespread credit deterioration. The recent recession was
accompanied by unusually sharp credit deterioration in many corpora-
tions—not just those in the telecom industry. This deterioration
contributed to the severe shrinkage of the commercial paper market.
Chart 3 displays the ratio of the number of firms downgraded to the
number of firms upgraded by Standard and Poor’s Corporation, for top-
tier commercial paper borrowers, from 1987 to 2002. For example, in
2001, 71 commercial paper programs were downgraded and three were
upgraded, yielding a ratio close to 24.6This downgrade-to-upgrade ratio
was much higher than its previous peak of 17 set in 1992, shortly after
the 1990 recession. The pace of credit deterioration worsened further in
2002. Through May 2002, there were 27 downgrades and one upgrade,
setting the highest downgrade-to-upgrade ratio on record.
A possible factor contributing to the fast and widespread credit dete-
rioration was the heavy corporate debt burden accumulated in the
1990s. The business expansion that started in the early 1990s was the
longest on record since World War II. As the expansion lengthened,ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 61
some corporations might have become overly optimistic and excessively
leveraged their balance sheets. Across the nation in the late 1990s, the
total nonfinancial corporate debt-to-GDP ratio increased steadily. In
1999, it surpassed the previous record of 43 percent, set in the recession
of 1990. Currently, it stands at about 47 percent.7 When companies
become more leveraged, they become more vulnerable to adverse shocks.
As business conditions deteriorated over the past two years, companies
found the health of their balance sheets deteriorating sharply. 
The reduced supply of credit in the market due to credit deteriora-
tion forces borrowers to seek alternative, and usually more expensive,
means of financing. Yet, it also provides an incentive for companies to
cut their debt burdens and improve their balance sheets. In the long
run, these adjustments will improve their credit quality and allow them
to borrow again in the commercial paper market, which will be benefi-




Notes: Data for 2002 is through May 2002. Only firms rated A-1
+/A-1 either before or after the rat-
ing change are included. Shaded bars indicate recessionary periods. For the most recent recession,
only the start date is shown.
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General reduction in risk tolerance
Investors’ risk tolerance is usually reduced when their confidence is
shaken. As investors in commercial paper are willing to take only
minimum risk with their holding of commercial paper, even in good
times, any reduction in their risk tolerance may lead them to refuse to
roll over all but the safest maturing commercial paper. Consequently,
when risk tolerance falls, the commercial paper market contracts.
Investor confidence and risk tolerance typically decline during and
after periods of financial market turbulence. In particular, financial
market turbulence has led to several episodes of shrinkage in the com-
mercial paper market. For example, after Penn Central railroad
defaulted on its commercial paper in 1970, many companies found
themselves unable to roll over their maturing commercial paper even
though their creditworthiness was not affected by the Penn Central
default.8 More recently, during the financial market crisis in the fall of
1998, the commercial paper market was stressed and its volume fell,
even though the crisis mainly involved financial companies, and the
nonfinancial firms with the highest credit quality experienced little
credit deterioration.9
In the past two years, the confidence of the commercial paper
investor has been shaken repeatedly, first by the unexpected defaults in
early 2001 and more recently by successive corporate scandals. As a
result, investors’ risk tolerance may have fallen considerably.
The defaults of two California utilities. The California power crisis in
the second half of 2000 and early 2001 seriously damaged the financial
health and credit worthiness of two large California utility companies:
Pacific Gas and Electricity (PG&E) and Southern California Edison
(SCE, a unit of Edison International). Although major rating agencies
rated these companies’ commercial paper programs in the top tier in
December 2000, both firms were downgraded repeatedly in January
2001 and soon defaulted on their maturing commercial paper.
This rapid change of fortune for the two California utility compa-
nies and their subsequent defaults might have served as a wake-up call
for investors in the commercial paper market and led to a reassessment
of risk elsewhere in the market. From the default of Columbia Gas
System in June 1991 to the end of 2000, the U.S. nonfinancial com-ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 63
mercial paper market had not experienced a single default. Conse-
quently, investors might have become overly optimistic and complacent
in the late 1990s, fueling the rapid growth in commercial paper during
that period. The defaults of the two utilities in themselves were already
big shocks to investors. Even more shocking was the fact that these were
the first ever defaults in the U.S. market by companies that, only one
month before defaulting, had been rated top tier.10 As a result, their
defaults may have led many investors to believe that the risk of default
might have been understated. Investors may have lost some confidence
in the rating agencies’ ability to assess accurately the creditworthiness of
commercial paper borrowers and thus reduced their supply of credit to
the market.
Corporate scandals. More recently, successive corporate scandals
have caused a “crisis of confidence” and may have reduced many
investors’ tolerance for risk. Recurrent corporate scandals have shown
there is serious weakness in both corporate governance and financial
market operations. Investor confidence in the reliability of the corpo-
rate accounting reports and in the fairness and transparency of financial
markets has been badly shaken. Consequently, companies with ques-
tionable accounting practices and companies with complex balance
sheets (which make it easier to mislead investors with “creative”
accounting methods) have been hit particularly hard. Many of them are
finding that the commercial paper market has become unreceptive. 
The experience of Tyco International is a case in point. While Tyco
appeared to have adequate cash flow and sufficient short-term liquidity,
the company’s operating and financial health had been difficult to
understand due to its complexity. Early in 2002, when questions
regarding the corporate governance of the company intensified, Tyco
found itself suddenly facing skeptical investors who refused to roll over
its $4.5 billion of maturing commercial paper. The company was forced
to make an “orderly exit” from the commercial paper market and to use
bank loans to pay off its maturing commercial paper at considerably
higher costs.11
One measure of investors’ risk tolerance is the spread between the
interest rates on high-quality corporate bonds and Treasury notes. As
investors’ risk tolerance declines, they tend to require a higher rate of
return for holding just slightly less safe debt, such as the highest-rated64 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
corporate bond.12 Chart 4 shows the interest rate spread between the
safest corporate bonds, those that are rated Aaa by Moody’s Investors
Service, and the 10-year Treasury notes. As is clear from the chart, the
spread has been elevated since the start of the recent recession. While it
fell soon after the beginning of 2002, it quickly rose again and stood at
2.3 percent in September 2002, compared to its average of only 0.8
percent from 1966 to the beginning of the most recent recession. 
When the decline in the supply of credit is caused by a reduction in
investors’ tolerance for risk, the decline represents a more hostile credit
environment for borrowers. Even healthy corporations find themselves
facing less receptive investors. Nevertheless, to the extent that much of
the reduced risk tolerance is caused by corporate scandals, a firm with
good corporate governance and transparent accounting practices can be
rewarded with less suspicious investors. In the aggregate, investors’ con-
fidence and risk tolerance may not recover until progress from
corporate reforms becomes apparent.13
Chart 4
THE YIELD SPREAD BETWEEN Aaa CORPORATE BONDS
AND 10-YEAR TREASURY NOTES
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessionary periods as defined by the NBER Business Cycle Dating
Committee. For the most recent recession, only the start date is indicated.
Sources: NBER, Moody’s Investors Service and U.S. Department of Treasury
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III. FACTORS REDUCING THE DEMAND FOR CREDIT 
On the demand side, two factors may reduce the need for corpora-
tions to borrow in the commercial paper market. One factor is a decline
in inventories which reduces companies’ short-term financing needs.
The other is a switch by firms from borrowing short term in the com-
mercial paper market to borrowing longer term in the bond market.
Reductions in business inventories
Reductions in business inventories may reduce the need for short-
term financing. By SEC regulation, proceeds from the issuance of
commercial paper are supposed to be used only to finance “current
transactions,” such as inventories or accounts receivable. Therefore,
when business inventories decline considerably, it is likely that firms’
need to issue commercial paper will also decline, resulting in a lower
volume of paper outstanding.14
In the recent recession, companies have been unusually quick to
adjust business inventories in response to declining sales. Previously,
firms reacted more slowly to sudden drops in sales in the early stages of
recessions, and inventory levels increased. For all recessions from 1966
to 1981, inventories continued to rise for almost 12 months on average
after the recession started. In the 1990 recession, movements in inven-
tory accumulation followed the similar pattern but the magnitude was
smaller and the decline started earlier. But business inventories behaved
very differently in the recent recession. Aggregate business inventories
started to decline in January 2001, two months before the onset of the
recession, and continued to decline for more than a year (Chart 5).15
Comparing Chart 2 with Chart 5 suggests that the quick adjustment
in inventories might have contributed to the contraction in the commer-
cial paper market. The levels of business inventories and the volume of
commercial paper outstanding exhibit the same pattern: They both
started to decline before the recent recession began. Just as commercial
paper has experienced its largest decline on record during the recent reces-
sion, so have inventories. Business inventories, however, stabilized early in
2002 and started to increase slightly, suggesting that the effect of reduced
credit demand due to inventory reduction is diminishing.66 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Large declines in the federal funds rate 
The demand for short-term credit such as commercial paper may
also fall when firms decide to borrow longer term.16 Typically in busi-
ness cycles, as the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) reduces
the federal funds rate, at some point, corporate debt mangers may come
to believe that a policy reversal will come soon and that short-term rates
will rise. They may therefore decide to replace a portion of their matur-
ing commercial paper with longer term bonds for two reasons. One is
to “lock in” the favorable borrowing rate for a longer period than the
typical 30-day term of commercial paper. The other is to reduce their
uncertainty about funding costs in coming years. Because it is generally
more difficult to forecast turning points, uncertainty regarding the
future path of short-term interest rates is greater when monetary policy
is near a turning point. By switching to longer term borrowing arrange-
ments, firms can reduce this uncertainty.17
Chart 5
NORMALIZED INVENTORY LEVELS AROUND THE
START OF RECESSIONS
Sources: NBER, U.S. Department of Commerce and author’s calculations
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1.20In the most recent recession, the FOMC eased monetary policy
aggressively. The FOMC started to lower the federal funds rate at the
beginning of 2001, before the recession even started, in contrast to
other recessions when the FOMC typically started to ease policy only
after a recession had started. The federal funds rate at the beginning of
2001 was 6.5 percent. It was reduced to 4 percent by May and 3.5
percent by August. At that point, some financial analysts speculated
that monetary policy was sufficiently stimulative to revive economic
growth and thus 3.5 percent might be close to the bottom for the
federal funds rate. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, however,
the FOMC lowered the federal funds rate another 1.75 percentage
points by the end of 2001, bringing it to a then 40-year low of 1.75
percent.18
There is some evidence that the aggressive easing of monetary
policy may have led more firms to switch from commercial paper
financing to longer term financing. For example, corporate bond
issuance, while down slightly from its unusually high level at the end of
2000, has been relatively robust in the past two years. Recent press
reports also suggest that many firms have lengthened their borrowing
terms by issuing longer term corporate bonds instead of rolling over
commercial paper (Feldheim).19
IV. CONCLUSION
Will the nonfinancial commercial paper market continue to shrink?
It depends on what happens to the factors driving the decline. Both
supply and demand factors have been at work. On the supply side, an
unusually widespread deterioration of credit quality and investors’
decreased tolerance for risk have reduced the supply of credit to the
market. These supply factors have shown few signs of abating. On the
demand side, the aggressive inventory reduction and the widespread
practice of replacing commercial paper with longer term corporate
bonds have reduced the demand for credit in the commercial paper
market. These demand factors appear to be winding down. Therefore, in
the near term, the market is likely to remain at current low levels or even
shrink further, but the pace of the shrinkage may moderate somewhat.
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APPENDIX 1: AN OVERVIEW OF 
THE U. S. COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET 
Commercial paper is short-term unsecured senior-level debt issued
by a corporation, a municipality, or a foreign government. For high-
quality corporate borrowers, it is one of the cheapest sources of external
funding available.
The maturity of commercial paper varies from one day to 270 days,
with the maximum determined by government regulations. Most com-
mercial paper matures in less than 90 days and the average maturity is
about 45 days.20 In the United States, a debt issuer must register the
planned issuance with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Because the registration fee is a fixed percentage of the notional value of
the debt issued and a debt issue has to be registered again every time it
is rolled over, it is more expensive to issue short-term debt. Commercial
paper, however, is exempted from registration, and thus the registration
fee, as long as its maturity is no more than 270 days and the proceeds
are used for current transactions, such as financing inventories, mergers
and acquisitions, or payrolls. 
Corporate issuers of commercial paper typically fall into two
groups: financial and nonfinancial firms. Financial firms include
finance companies, banks or bank holding companies, securities firms,
and insurance companies. Nonfinancial commercial paper issuers are
typically large industrial and service companies, or utilities, both public
and private. 
Investors in commercial paper are primarily money market mutual
funds, trust funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and large firms
with extra cash to invest. By regulation, commercial paper is sold in
very large denominations, which puts it beyond the reach of most indi-
vidual investors. Individual investors nevertheless hold large amounts of
commercial paper indirectly through money market mutual funds. In
most cases, investors hold commercial paper to maturity because the
secondary market for commercial paper is small and fairly illiquid.
Commercial paper has been issued for a long time and has been
regulated since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933. But only since
the 1960s has it become a meaningful source of funding for nonfinan-
cial corporations. In the 1990s, the volume of nonfinancial commercialECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 69
paper outstanding was typically 25 to 40 percent of the outstanding
volume issued by financial firms. The share fell to about 14 percent by
September 2002 as a result of the dramatic shrinkage of the market for
nonfinancial commercial paper. 
Commercial paper has been rated by rating agencies since the early
1970s, after the default of the Penn Central railroad in 1970. The three
major SEC-designated “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Orga-
nizations” that regularly provide ratings on commercial paper are
Standard and Poor’s Corporation, Moody’s Investors Service, and Fitch
Investors Service. The rating assignments of Standard and Poor’s are A-
1+, A-1, A-2, A-3, and B. The ratings of Moody’s are P-1 (short for
Prime-1), P-2, P-3, and NP (Not Prime). And the ratings of Fitch are
F-1+, F-1, F-2, F-3, B, C, and D. For a commercial paper issue to be
rated in the top tier, it has to be rated as A-1+ or A-1 by Standard and
Poor’s, or P-1 by Moody’s, or F-1+ or F-1 by Fitch.
In practice, it is imperative for a commercial paper issuer to have a
backup line of credit, usually from banks with the highest credit ratings.
The backup credit line assures investors that adequate funds will be
available to repay the commercial paper when it matures. The
minimum backup facility is typically 75 percent of the total size of the
issuance for top-tier issues and 100 percent for lower rated issues.
Backup facilities are only meant to provide emergency assistance for
short-term liquidity difficulties, such as a temporary liquidity shortage
due to a snowstorm that disrupts check processing. They are not
intended to enhance the credit quality of issues. In fact, most of the
backup facilities include “material adverse change” clauses that allow the
banks to cancel the backup lines if an issuer’s financial health deterio-
rates considerably.21
Asset-backed commercial paper is excluded from the above discus-
sion and from the consideration in the text because it is fundamentally
different from traditional commercial paper. It is essentially a
passthrough security, typically with accounts receivable as the backup
asset that is being passed through, just as an asset-backed mortgage secu-
rity is a passthrough security with mortgage payments being passed
through. Developed by large commercial banks in the 1980s, asset-
backed commercial paper has provided inexpensive financing for
accounts receivable for companies that are typically unable to issue tradi-70 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
tional commercial paper in the market. In addition to the backup asset,
asset-backed commercial paper is usually also supported by credit and
liquidity enhancement facilities provided by high-quality commercial
banks. Further, the rating of an asset-backed commercial paper program
often depends on the adequacy of the enhancement facilities and the
credit quality of the banks providing the facilities. Since its inception,
asset-backed commercial paper has grown rapidly and its volume out-
standing has already surpassed that of nonfinancial commercial paper.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 71
APPENDIX 2: THE QUANTITY RESPONSE 
OF THE COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET AND THE
“ORDERLY EXIT” MECHANISM
The commercial paper market is generally accessible only to com-
panies with very high credit quality, as only such companies can find
buyers for their commercial paper. Investors in the market appear to
require commercial paper to have virtually no default risk, or to be
“near-riskless” (Calomiris and others). For example, at the beginning of
2000, Moody’s Investors Service rated roughly 89 percent of the global
outstanding commercial paper issues in the top tier and a further 10
percent in the second tier. For a commercial paper issue to be rated in
the top or second tier, a rating agency has to be convinced that the
probability of an issuer’s default is virtually zero.22 Naturally, only com-
mercial paper issued by companies with very high credit quality will
meet such a stringent standard.
As a consequence of this insistence on the safety of commercial
paper, the market response to credit deterioration is reflected mainly in
the quantity (volume outstanding) instead of the price (the interest rate
on commercial paper). For example, if an issuer’s credit quality deterio-
rates and is downgraded from the top tier to the second tier, even
though the default risk in its commercial paper is still minuscule, many
previous investors may refuse to roll over the issuer’s maturing commer-
cial paper. Consequently, the issuer’s volume of commercial paper
outstanding will decline over time as more and more existing commer-
cial paper matures without being replaced by new issues. This is called
the “orderly exit” mechanism of the commercial paper market.23 In
comparison, the interest rate on the issuer’s commercial paper might
not change materially because investors tend to hold commercial paper
to maturity and trading of commercial paper on the secondary market
seldom occurs. 
In the aggregate, if deterioration in the credit quality of companies
in the highest credit tier is widespread, the size of the commercial paper
market will decline quickly. The average interest rate on commercial
paper, on the other hand, is unlikely to move up or down significantly
for two reasons. The rate is unlikely to move up significantly because,
after weakened issuers have left the market, the average quality of the72 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
remaining commercial paper issuers will probably remain roughly
unchanged. The rate is unlikely to move down significantly because,
from the perspective of many investors, the near-riskless property of
commercial paper makes it comparable to other safe short-term debt,
such as Treasury bills. Consequently, the average interest rate on com-
mercial paper is bounded below by the interest rate on Treasuries with
similar maturities.24
The Appendix Chart provides evidence that the average interest rate
on 30-day commercial paper appears to follow the federal funds rate
closely, and the spread between the two rates seems to have little relation
to credit quality. The dashed line shows the average interest rate on 30-
day commercial paper, the grey solid line shows the federal funds rate
(both scaled on the left axis), and the black solid line shows the spread
between the two (scaled on the right axis).25The federal funds rate tends
to be lower in economic slowdowns, when corporate credit quality tends
to worsen. Therefore, if the interest rate on commercial paper reflected
changes in credit quality, its spread with the federal funds rate would rise
when the federal funds rate fell. But there is little evidence that this is the
THE YIELD SPREAD BETWEEN THE COMMERCIAL
PAPER RATE AND THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE
Note: The vertical bar indicates the start date of the most recent recession.
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case. In fact, it appears that seasonal fluctuations, such as the rise in the
spread occurred regularly at the end of each year, are the dominant deter-
minant of changes in the spread. 
Two schools of thought offer explanations for why very high-
quality commercial paper dominates the market. One school points to
the structure of the market. First, SEC regulations allow money market
mutual funds to own only top-tier or second-tier commercial paper.
The regulations also restrict a money market mutual fund’s holdings of
second-tier commercial paper not to exceed 5 percent of the total assets
of the fund. These regulations have effectively curtailed the demand for
lower quality commercial paper. Second, the credit risk in commercial
paper is difficult to manage or hedge because the secondary market is
very limited, mainly due to the short and variable maturity of commer-
cial paper. The difficulties in hedging the risk further reduce investors’
demand for lower quality commercial paper.
The other school believes that the primary reason only very high-
quality commercial paper can be issued is that investors’ demand for
commercial paper is concentrated on very high quality issues. In other
words, the commercial paper market serves to provide a debt instru-
ment that is almost a perfect substitute for money to meet the liquidity
management needs of large investors. Only commercial paper issued by
very high-quality firms can be considered “near-riskless” and therefore
comparable to money. In practice, issuers are usually flexible in tailoring
the maturity of their commercial paper to meet investors’ needs for liq-
uidity management, which is consistent with this explanation.26
According to this school, the SEC regulations simply codify and for-
malize the informal practice of the market (Schnure).74 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1 This decline in nonfinancial commercial paper contrasts sharply with
developments in the market for financial commercial paper. The total volume of
financial commercial paper also peaked in November 2000 (about $1.28 trillion)
but had declined only about 8 percent by September 2002. 
2 Calomiris and others discuss this feature of the market.
3 Moody’s Investor Service estimated that 80 percent of the commercial
paper issues rated by the company were in the top tier in late 2000, and another
17 percent were in the second tier. 
4 This response is in sharp contrast to the longer term corporate bond mar-
ket, where a general reduction in borrowers’ creditworthiness will mostly be
reflected in the increased interest rate that borrowers have to pay to induce
investors, with relatively minor impact on the outstanding volume of bonds.
5 In addition, Qwest and WorldCom were downgraded from their second-
tier rating in 2001 and 2002, which virtually shut them out of the commercial
paper market.
6 The numbers of downgrades and upgrades in 2001 are from conversations
with the research staff at Standard and Poor’s Corporation. The number of down-
grades shows that the credit deterioration is not confined to the telecom industry. 
7 In addition to the debt-to-GDP ratio, analysts also use debt-to-asset ratios
or debt-to-equity ratios to measure the leverage of companies (Osler and Hong).
These alternative measures, however, are heavily influenced by the stock prices of
the companies. In the late 1990s, high stock prices masked increases in many
companies’ leverage ratios. 
8 Calomiris provides a detailed account of events around the Penn Central
default.
9 Saidenberg and Strahan investigate the commercial paper market during
that period.
10 Moody’s Investor Service, for example, stated in October 2000 that for a
180-day period, the estimated default risk was 0.00 percent for top-tier commer-
cial paper.
11 Press release, Tyco International Ltd., February 4, 2002.
12 The spread may also increase due to continuous credit deterioration in the
corporate sector if market prices react faster than rating agencies’ rating changes.
Then, if there is a continuous deterioration in credit quality, the average credit
quality of borrowers in the Aaa rating may decline, and thus the spread may
increase. In this case, the spread becomes a proxy for both supply factors.
13 In practice, it is difficult to distinguish a reduction in investors’ risk toler-
ance from a general increase in the perceived riskiness of borrowers. For reasons
similar to the previous footnote, a general increase in the perceived riskiness of
borrowers will also lead to an increase in the spread between the interest rates on
high-quality corporate bonds and Treasury notes. To the extend that the increase
in the perceived riskiness exceeds the actual increase in the riskiness of borrowers,
the effect of the change is the same as a reduction in investors’ risk tolerance.
14 Winters has investigated the linkage between business inventories and
nonfinancial commercial paper. Calomiris and others provide empirical evidence
that relates the demand for commercial paper to firms’ inventories.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 75
15 The inventory data have been adjusted to smooth seasonal fluctuations.
16 This practice is called “term-out” in the corporate borrowing market.
17 Regression analysis confirms that both the federal funds rate and business
inventories are significant in explaining the total volume of nonfinancial com-
mercial paper outstanding, and have the expected signs. Specifically, to explain
the annual changes in nonfinancial commercial paper outstanding, regressions
that include annual rates of changes in the federal funds rate, business invento-
ries, as well as lags of the dependent variable appear to do a decent job with good
fit and little residual serial correlation. Both changes in the federal funds rate and
business inventories are positively significant in the regression. However, changes
in the spread or the levels of the spread do not improve the regression and the
coefficients are not significant.
18 The FOMC lowered the federal funds rate another 0.5 percentage point
in November 2002, to 1.25 percent.
19 In addition, many companies have recently reported in their regulatory fil-
ings that they have either “termed-out” their commercial paper or are in the
process of doing so. 
20 Moody’s Investors Service.
21This paragraph is based on Hahn’s article, which also contains more detailed
information about the regulatory and institutional structure of the market.
22 For example, Moody’s Investors Service states that its “objective in assign-
ing short-term ratings is that commercial paper should never default with a Prime
rating.” Other major rating agencies appear to have similar criteria because their
ratings for commercial paper issues are usually comparable. 
23 Crabbe and Post provide empirical evidence supporting the existence of
the mechanism.
24 The interest rate on Treasury bills should be slightly lower than the inter-
est rate on commercial paper because Treasury bills are safer and the interest
income they generate is exempt from state income taxes. 
25 Data on the average interest rate on 30-day commercial paper are available
from 1997 onward. Data collected before 1997 are not based on market prices
and therefore are not comparable. 
26 Issuers benefit from this arrangement by borrowing funds at low rates.76 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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